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A Reason to Discriminate: Curtailing the Use of Title
VII Analysis in Claims Arising Under the ADEA
"There is ... no harsher verdict in most men's lives than
someone else's judgment that they are no longer worth their
keep. It is then, when the answer at the hiring gate is 'You're
too old,' that a man turns away... finding 'nothing to look
forward to with pride, nothing to look forward to with
hope. "l
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 2003-2004 term, the United States Supreme Court
decided that reverse age discrimination claims were not viable under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).2 The ADEA
was enacted in 1967 on the heels of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'
One of the reasons Congress enacted the ADEA was to promote the
hiring of older persons within the workplace by prohibiting employers
from terminating or refusing to hire a person solely based upon his or
her old age.4 Thus, the ADEA offers statutory protection to
individuals forty years of age and older from employment
discrimination based upon their age.'
In the late 1960s and 1970s, reverse discrimination claims began
to appear as a result of the civil rights revolution.6 Reverse
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. This statement set the theme and tone of Secretary of Labor W. Willard
Wirtz's report on the state of the older American worker in 1964. Inspired by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress ordered the Secretary of Labor to conduct a
study on the issues confronting older American workers. W. Willard Wirtz, The
Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment (Report) at 1 (Dep't
of Labor 1965).
2. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 124 S. Ct. 1236
(2004).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-202,81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (2004)).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2004).
5. See id. § 631. Originally, the ADEA's protected class included individuals
who were forty years old through and including individuals sixty-five years of age.
Pub. L. No. 90-202 § 12, 81 Stat. 602, 607 (1967). In 1978, as a response to public
opinion polls indicating strong sentiment against the mandatory retirement age of
sixty-five, Congress increased the ADEA's upper age limit to seventy years of age.
Pub. L. No. 95-256 § 12, 92 Stat. 189 (1978); Raymond F. Gregory, Age
Discrimination in the American Workplace: Old at a Young Age 20 (2001). Once
again, in 1986, due to the benefits that older, more experienced workers bring to the
economy, Congress amended the ADEA's upper age limit by eliminating it
altogether. Pub. L. No. 99-592 § 2(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342 (1986) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 631 (2004)); Gregory, supra note 5, at 20.
6. David Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing Protected Class: Reflections
on Reverse Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Racial Balancing, 2000 Wis.
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discrimination occurs when employers adversely target employees,
who are members of the traditionally accepted majority class,
through discriminatory actions because of their majority status.7 For
instance, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.8 three
employees were caught stealing from their employer's cargo.9 The
two plaintiffs, both Caucasian employees, sued their former
employer for racial discrimination when they were terminated and
an African-American employee, who had committed the same
offense, was not discharged.' ° The Court, relying upon the
Congressional intent underlying Title VII and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission interpretations of the statute, concluded
that Title VII prohibits all discriminatory employment practices
made on the basis of race." Hence, the Court held that the plaintiff
employees in McDonald had stated a cause of action. 2
The McDonald decision has provided legal footing for plaintiffs
in reverse discrimination claims to stand upon. In fact, it has been
suggested that reverse discrimination claims are now "rampant"
within our society. 3  According to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the number of reverse discrimination
claims filed by white employees nearly doubled from ten percent to
approximately seventeen percent between 1991 and 1996.14 It has
also been suggested that with demographic changes in the American
workforce contributing to more diverse workplaces, an increase in
the number of reverse discrimination claims filed is highly
probable.5
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that, despite their
similarities, there are some significant differences between
discrimination claims arising under Title VII and those arising
L. Rev. 657, 662 (2000).
7. William D. Evans, Jr., Reverse Discrimination Claims-Growing Like
Kudzu, 37 Md. B.J. 48, 48 (2004); Timothy K. Giordano, Different Treatment for
Non-minority Plaintiffs Under Title VII: A Call For Modification of the
Background Circumstances Test to Ensure that Separate Is Equal, 49 Emory L.J.
993, 993 (2000).
8. 427 U.S. 273, 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
9. Id. at 275-76, 96 S. Ct. at 2576-77.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 279-80, 96 S. Ct. at 2578-79.
12. Id. at 280, 96 S. Ct. at 2579.
13. Evans, supra note 7; Giordano, supra note 7.
14. Ruth Larson, Claims of Bias Rising in Agencies, Wash. Times, Sept. 17,
1997, at Al.
15. Camille 0. Olsen, Remarks at Meeting on Repositioning for New Realities:
Securing EEOC's Continued Effectiveness before the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Sept. 8, 2003, Washington D.C., available at
www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/meetings/9-8-03/index.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2005).
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under the ADEA. Because of these differences, the Supreme Court
correctly held that reverse age discrimination claims should not be
permitted under the ADEA.
Initially, this paper provides the historical background and
development of both the ADEA and Title VII. In Part II, Hazen
Paper Company v. Biggins1 6 is discussed for its significance as the
first indication by the Supreme Court that ADEA claims differ from
Title VII claims. More specifically, in Hazen, the Court implied that
while disparate impact may be applicable under Title VII, it might not
be suitable for the ADEA. Part II analyzes the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals' analysis of General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
Cline' and subsequently presents the United States Supreme Court's
opinion on the case. The Sixth Circuit held that the ADEA provides
a cause of action for employees within the protected class who allege
claims of age discrimination against their employer because their
employer treated older employees more favorably. 8 However, after
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's
decision in General Dynamics, holding that reverse age
discrimination claims are not viable under the ADEA. 19 In order to
evaluate the propriety of the Supreme Court's holding, the ADEA is
compared with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)20 because
of analogous difficulties presented by the class of persons protected
under each statute. In addition, two distinct discrimination theories,
the formal equality theory and the protected class theory, will be
explored to assess whether reverse age discrimination claims are
plausible. This theoretical analysis will be used to buttress the
Supreme Court's decision to reverse the Sixth Circuit's decision in
General Dynamics, thereby prohibiting reverse age discrimination
claims. Ultimately, this paper will conclude that the Supreme Court's
decision was proper and has curtailed the future expansion of Title
VII jurisprudence into the unique realm of age discrimination.
II. BACKGROUND: TITLE VII AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT
A. Impetus for Enacting the ADEA
Like most anti-discrimination statutes, the impetus for and the
history of the ADEA can be traced to a single revolutionary
16. 507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
17. 296 F.3d. 466 (6th Cir. 2002), rev'd, Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc.v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 124 S. Ct. 1236 (2004).
18. Id.
19. 540 U.S. 581, 124 S. Ct. 1236 (2004).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2004).
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enactment: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII
served as the first federal legislation prohibiting discrimination in the
hiring, firing, promoting, training, and compensating of employees
for the reason of race, color, sex, national origin, or religion.21 The
legislative history indicates that Congress was particularly interested
in eliminating the discriminatory treatment experienced by African-
Americans.2" Overall, however, Title VII served as the nation's first
legislation requiring employers to make employment decisions about
individuals strictly based upon their ability, as opposed to protected
characteristics such as race or gender.23
Congress did not prohibit age discrimination in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 partly due to its "substantially different" nature when
compared with those forms of discrimination covered under the Act.24
Specifically, age discrimination, unlike discrimination based upon race,
has not historically been animus based.25
In 1964, age discrimination in employment was not a new thing;
stereotypical thinking about older persons, or ageism, had existed in the
United States since at least the 1800s.2 6 The Department of Labor
report noted that employers held beliefs and misconceptions about
21. Id. § 2000e-2 (2004).
22. H.R. Rep. No. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391. The
House Report stated, "[T]oday, more than 100 years after their formal
emancipation, Negroes, who make up over 10 percent of our population, are by
virtue of one or another type of discrimination not accorded the rights, privileges,
and opportunities, which are considered to be, and must be, the birthright of all
citizens." Id., 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2393.
23. Maria A. Citeroni, Iadimarco v. Runyon and Reverse Discrimination:
Gaining Majority Support for the Majority Plaintiffs, 48 Clev. St. L. Rev. 579,582-
83 (2000).
24. Nancy Lane, After Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of 1991:
Providing Attorney's Fees to Plaintiffs in Mixed Motive Age Discrimination Cases,
3 Elder L.J. 341, 344 (1995).
25. Id. at 344 n. 14. The author wishes to express that she has oversimplified
the issue of race discrimination strictly for the ease of analysis. The author is aware
of the highly complex nature of race discrimination. Animus-based actions and
beliefs simply cannot explain the existence of race discrimination in modem-day
society. Rather, race discrimination occurs because individuals have
misconceptions and stereotypical beliefs about persons because of their race, color,
language, culture, and ethnicity.
26. Ageism, a term credited to one of the nation's most notable gerontologists,
Dr. Robert Butler, is a stereotypical way of thinking about the old. For instance, in
the employment setting, an employer who has an ageist attitude believes that as a
person ages, he or she becomes less productive or competent than a younger person,
solely because of the employee's age. An employer with ageist beliefs may also
think that as individuals age they lose their creative ability, become incapable of
learning new things, and contest change and innovation. Gregory, supra note 5, at
23.
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older workers being slower and less productive." In the Department's
study, employers indicated that older employees suffered from mental
or physical deterioration at age forty-five making them unable to
perform certain duties orjob requirements.28 In a capitalist society such
as ours, being perceived as unproductive is the death knell in
employment. The results of this study also indicated that not only were
older Americans being forced into early retirement and replaced with
younger workers,29 but older workers were less likely to be hired than
younger workers.3° Many states at the time of the Department of
Labor's report had legislation in effect aimed at eliminating age
discrimination.3' However, several states indicated that a federal law
prohibiting age discrimination would enable states to better serve and
protect the older employee through education and training.32
The Department's research concluded that age should not be
associated with one's usefulness or ability in the workforce.33 But,
Secretary of Labor Wirtz recommended against extending anti-
discrimination laws pertaining to racial or sex discrimination to age
discrimination. 34  Wirtz recognized that age discrimination was
substantially different from other forms of discrimination.35  For
instance, Wirtz explicitly stated that "[t]he gist of the matter is that
'discrimination' means something very different, so far as employment
practices involving age are concerned, from what it means in
connection with discrimination involving-for example-race. ' '36
Historically, racial discrimination originated from feelings of dislike or
animosity toward members of another group; whereas age
discrimination is more frequently based on inaccurate assumptions and
beliefs about an individual's abilities.37
In response to the Department's report, Congress enacted the
ADEA in 1967.38 The ADEA prohibits employers from using age as
27. Wirtz, supra note 1, at 8.
28. W. Willard Wirtz, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in
Employment (Research Materials) at 10 (Dep't of Labor 1965).
29. Id. at 27, 29-35.
30. Id. at 4-5.
31. The Department of Labor's report listed twenty-one states that had private
employment discrimination laws in effect in 1965. The twenty-one states were as
follows: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Washington, and
Wisconsin. Id. at 116.
32. Id. at 111.
33. Wirtz, supra note 1, at 21.
34. ld. at 2-3.
35. Id. at 5-6.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Lane, supra note 24, at 344 n.14.
38. Id. at 344.
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an employment factor for hiring, firing, promoting, or demoting an
individual in the workplace. 39 The purposes of the ADEA are to
"promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather
than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to
help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment."'  Those initially rotected
by the ADEA were individuals aged forty to sixty-five.4p But, in
1986, Congres's removed the maximum age limitation which changed
the age span of the ADEA's protected class to include anyone forty
years of age or older.42
B. America's Aging Workforce
Because of the financial needs of older workers, the United States
is facing the largest older workforce it has ever seen.43 The nation's
baby-boomers are grown u, living longer, and taking an active role
in our nation's workforce. In fact, by 2006, all of our nation's baby
boomers will be within the ADEA's protected class.45 The unstable
economy has encouraged employers to be more efficient and
resourceful with their employees, while remaining productive. As a
result, downsizing and early retirement options are more
commonplace.46 Older workers are finding themselves the victims of
such business practices.47 Relying on the ADEA, older workers have
39. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2004).
40. Id. § 621.
41. Pub. L. 90-202 § 12 (1967).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2004) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 99-592 § 2(c)(1) (1986)).
43. Nancy R. Lockwood, The Aging Workforce, Human Resource Magazine,
Dec. 1, 2003, at 1 (attributing financial needs and economics as the major reason
why more older persons are working or seeking work).
44. Sara E. Rix, Working Longer in the United States, at
http:www.jil.go.jp/seika/us.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004); News Release, United
States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., HHS Issues Report Showing Dramatic
Improvements in American's Health Over Past 50 Years: Infant Mortality at
Record Low, Life Expectancy at Record High (Sept. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2O02pres/20020912.html.
45. Gregory, supra note 5, at 1-2.
46. H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Kendall L. Kelly, Price Waterhouse: Alive and
Well Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 721,
723 (2000); see generally, Rix, supra note 44; News Release, supra note 44
(discussing association of high costs with older employees in the form of health care
and professional training).
47. See News Release, The United States Equal Opportunity Employment
Comm'n, Gulfstream Aerospace to Pay $2.1 Million For Age Bias in EEOC
Settlement (Dec. 11, 2002), available at www.eeoc.gov/press/12-11-02.html
(settlement reached between defendant and class of management level plaintiffs,
forty years old and older, who were laid off or forced to retire during a reduction-in-
force); see also News Release, The United States Equal Opportunity Employment
416 [Vol. 65
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a resource to challenge any employment discharges or other adverse
employment actions taken on account of their age.48 In fiscal year
2002, the number of age discrimination claims filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission reached 19,921, a two and
one-tenth percent increase over the previous year.49 As our society
continues to age, we can only expect the number of ADEA claims to
continue to escalate.
C. Substantive Provisions of the ADEA
As previously mentioned, the ADEA prohibits arbitrary
discrimination against employees forty years old and older because of
their age.5° Under the ADEA employers are prohibited from
terminating or refusing to hire an individual on the account of her
age;5 from treating any aspect of an individual's employment, such
as compensation or terms of employment, differently on account of
an individual's age;52 from segregating an employee in such a way as
to hinder her from being promoted or subjecting her to adverse
treatment on account of her age;5 3 or reducing an employee's wages
in order to comply with the ADEA.54 Employment agencies and labor
organizations are subject to similar provisions under the ADEA. 55
The ADEA also has some additional requirements that must be
adhered to by employers. For instance, employers, employment
agencies, and labor organizations may not retaliate against any
employee who "has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation" under the
ADEA.56 Furthermore, employers may not print or publish any
employment advertisement specifically limiting or discriminating
against potential applicants on the basis of their age.57 But, employers
are required to post notices in visible locations at all times throughout
Comm'n, EEOC Charges Sidley & Austin with Age Discrimination (Jan. 13, 2005),
available at www.eeoc.gov/press/l-13-05.html (suit filed by EEOC alleging that
defendant law firm violated the ADEA by forcing certain partners on account of
their age to either leave the firm or retire).
48. Robert Coulson, Empowered at Forty 4 (1990).
49. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) Charges FY 1992-FY 2004, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2004).
51. Id. § 623(a)(1).
52. Id. § 623(a)(2).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 623(a)(3).
55. Id. §§ 623(b), (c)(1)-(c)(3).
56. Id. § 623(d).
57. Id. § 623(e).
2004]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the employment setting that contain information about employees'
rights under the ADEA, and how to proceed on such a claim.58 And
yet, despite all of the limitations the ADEA places upon employers,
the ADEA does provide employers with some leeway when it comes
to early retirement and health plans. Specifically, the ADEA does
permit employers to offer employees voluntary, early retirement
plans,59 and to consider an employee's age when it is a "bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business. 60
An employee who wants to pursue an ADEA claim must first file
a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the discriminatory
action occurs, unless she lives within a deferral state.61 If an
employee lives in a deferral state, a state that has its own age
discrimination laws and has also authorized a state agency or
authority to seek relief for such a claim, then she must file a charge
with the EEOC within 300 days from the date on which the unlawful
action occurred,62 "or within 30 days after receipt by the individual of
notice of termination proceedings under state law, whichever is
earlier." 63 Under the ADEA an employee may seek civil penalties
against his or her employer in the form of damages for back pay and
equitable relief.64 Furthermore, the ADEA prohibits employers from
engaging in retaliatory action against an employee.65
D. Impact of Title VII on ADEA Claims
Title VII and the ADEA were both enacted to serve a similar
function: to eradicate discrimination in the workplace.66 Due to their
similar statutory construction and purpose, courts have traditionally
relied upon Title VII to serve as the guide or standard by which
claims arising under the ADEA are analyzed.67 For instance, in the
58. Id. § 627.
59. Id. § 623(m).
60. Id. § 623(f)(1).
61. Id. § 626(d)(1).
62. Id. §§ 626(d)(2), 633(b).
63. Id. § 626(d)(2).
64. Id. § 626(b), (c)(1).
65. Id. § 623(d).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2004); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2004).
67. Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and
the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn't Bark, 39 Wayne
L. Rev. 1093, 1096-97 (1993); see also Hase v. Missouri, 972 F.2d 893 (8th Cir.
1992); Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d. 339 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Ragland v. Rock-Tenn Co., 955 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Il. 1997) (aforementioned
cases discuss applicability of McDonnell Douglas prima facie test used in Title VII
cases to ADEA claims); see also Moss v. Detroit Edison Co. 149 F.3d 1184 (6th
418 [Vol. 65
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past, the courts have applied both disparate treatment analysis and
disparate impact analysis to ADEA claims, both of which were
initially applied to Title VII claims.68
A plaintiff may allege disparate treatment, or intentional
discrimination, under both the ADEA and Title VII. 69 The Supreme
Court has described disparate treatment as "the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."70 In order to prevail on a disparate treatment
claim, discriminatory motive,71 or intent, must be shown.72
Discriminatory motive may be shown by the plaintiff in one of two
ways: present direct evidence, such as an employer's discriminatory
treatment of certain persons because of their race or sex, that facially
demonstrates the prohibited discriminatory motive; or, present
circumstantial evidence from which discriminatory motive may be
inferred by the fact-finder through the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie test.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee must
first establish a prima facie case demonstrating that she was
performing her work satisfactorily and that her employer took
Cir. 1998); Hulsey v. Kmart, Inc. 43 F.3d. 555 (10th Cir. 1994); Hamilton v. 1st
Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1990); Mogley v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 719
F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1983) (aforementioned cases apply the reasoning from Delaware
State College v. Ricks, a Title VII case, to ADEA claims whereby statute of
limitations begins to run from the day on which the adverse employment action
occurs).
68. See W. VA. Univ./W. VA. Bd. of Regents v. Decker, 447 S.E.2d 259, 264
(W. Va. 1994) ("The Supreme Court has specifically declined to decide whether
disparate impact theory is applicable to claims under the ADEA. However, the
majority of circuit courts [1st, 6th, 7th, 10th] considering the issue have decided
to apply disparate impact analysis to claims arising under the ADEA."); Faulkner
v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1428 (10th Cir. 1993) (assuming viability
of disparate impact theory to ADEA claims); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d.
1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing applicability of both disparate treatment and
disparate impact theories to the ADEA); Smith v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 99
F.3d. 1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1996)(discussing the application of disparate impact
claims under the ADEA within the 8th Circuit post-Hazen).
69. H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Kendall L. Kelly, Price Waterhouse: Alive and
Well Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 721,
734 (2000).
70. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 97 S. Ct.
1843, 1854 (1977).
71. Rebecca Hanner White, Employment Law and Employment Discrimination
77 (1998).
72. Dennard & Kelly, supra note 69, at 734.
73, White, supra note 71, at 78-79 (prima facie test was derived from the




discriminatory action against her. The significance of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case is that "it creates a legally mandatory,
rebuttable presumption of unlawful motive. If the defendant remains
silent in the face of a prima facie case, the plaintiff wins. 74 Once a
prima facie case has been established, the employer must "articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its conduct (i.e., not
hiring an African-American person for a job position because they
were not qualified, as opposed to an illegitimate, reason: because of
her race).75 If the employer meets its burden, then the burden of
production shifts back to the employee to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the reason offered by her employer to explain its
actions "was in fact pretext. ,76
Despite the availability of the McDonnell Douglas pretext
requirement, in certain cases the fact-finder may find that both lawful
and unlawful factors motivated an employer to make the challenged
employment decision.77 These cases are more commonly referred to
as mixed-motive cases. 71 More often than not, mixed-motive cases
only arise when a plaintiff provides direct evidence of the employer's
discriminatory behavior; therefore, the McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting analysis is inapplicable.79
The Supreme Court defined the mixed-motive analysis in the
landmark case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.80  The Price
Waterhouse proof structure requires a plaintiff alleging employment
discrimination to provide direct evidence of an employer's reliance
on discriminatory factors in making its employment decisions. 81 If
74. Id. at 79.
75. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 98 S. Ct. 1817,
1824 (1973).
76. Id. at 804, 93 S. Ct. at 1825.
77. Dennard & Kelly, supra note 69, at 739; White, supra note 71, at 81.
78. See Dennard & Kelly, supra note 69, at 739.
79. White, supra note 71, at 82.
80. 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
81. Id. at 243-46, 109 S. Ct. 1786-1789 (1989). However, the United States
Supreme Court's 2003 decision, Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.
Ct. 2148 (2003) has blurred the once distinctive line between the McDonnell
Douglas pretext cases and the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive cases. According
to Costa, a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination under Title VII no longer
has to provide direct evidence of an employer's reliance on discriminatory factors
in making its employment decisions. Rather an employee need only "present
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude by a preponderance of
evidence that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice."' Costa, 539 U.S. at 101, 123 S. Ct. at 2155. A
glimpse of the far reaching impact of Costa may be seen in the recent Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision, Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir.
2004). The court held, "Desert Palace modifies the McDonnell Douglas analysis
in ADEA cases such that a plaintiff can proceed on a mixed-motives theory even
420 [Vol. 65
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the plaintiff convinces a fact-finder that this evidence influenced the
employment decision-making process, then the burden of proof, or
persuasion rather, shifts to the employer.82 The employer then needs
to prove that the same employment decision would have been made
without the influence of an improper, discriminatory motive. s3 If the
employer satisfies this burden, then it will not be held liable.84
Another theory of discrimination under Title VII is the disparate
impact theory of discrimination. Disparate impact theory occurs
when a facially neutral employment practice adversely impacts one
group more harshly than another and cannot be justified by a business
need." Unlike disparate treatment, a plaintiff need not prove any
discriminatory motive when she alleges disparate impact.8 6 The
Supreme Court introduced disparate impact analysis in the seminal
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.87
In Griggs, several African-American employees filed a class
action discrimination suit against their employer under Title VII.88
Prior to the enactment of Title VII, the defendant openly
discriminated against African-American employees, whereby they
were only employed in the company's Labor Department.
Employees who worked in the Labor Department, as opposed to the
other departments, received the lowest salaries.90 Subsequent to the
without direct evidence of discrimination." Rachid, 376 F.3d at 316. Essentially,
the Rachid court endorsed the application of post-Costa mixed-motive analysis
under Title VII to ADEA claims. Id. at 312. According to the Fifth Circuit, this
analysis represented a merging of the McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse
approaches, such that this new approach would be coined for simplicity, the
"modified McDonnell Douglas approach." Id. Under the modified McDonnell
Douglas approach, a plaintiff-employee alleging an ADEA claim must initially
demonstrate that she has a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. Once this burden
has been met, the employer must provide a legitimate and lawful reason for her
questionable employment decision. Id. Next, the employee must either provide
evidentiary support that her employer's reason is only pretext, or that although the
employer's reason is true, it is not the only reason for her conduct, and that the
plaintiff-employee's age served as another motivating factor of her employer's
adverse conduct. Id. Finally, if the employee is able to prove that age was a
motivating factor in the adverse employment decision, then her employer must
demonstrate that it would have made the same adverse employment decision
regardless of the discriminatory animus. Id.
82. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 230, 276-78, 109 S. Ct. at 1804-05
(O'Connor, J. concurring).
83. Id. at 258, 190 S. Ct. at 1795.
84. Id.
85. White, supra note 71, at 91.
86. Id.
87. 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
88. Id.




enactment of Title VII, plaintiffs' employer instituted two mandatory
requirements: in order for an employee in the Labor Department to
receive a transfer, he had to have a high school degree, and to qualify
for placement in all departments except for the Labor Department, an
employee had to receive satisfactory scores on two standardized
general intelligence tests. 91
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that "there was no
showing of racial purpose or invidious intent in the adoption of the
high school diploma requirement or general intelligence test and that
these standards had been applied fairly to whites and Negroes
alike."92 Therefore, due to the absence of any discriminatory purpose,
the Court of Appeals held that such requirements were permitted
under the Title VII. 93 However, the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals by looking to the purpose of Title VII: to achieve
equality and to remove barriers that favored whites over nonwhites in
the employment setting.94 Title VII "proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation."95 However, the Court did acknowledge
that Title VII did not prohibit employment testing which had a
discriminatory effect if it was absolutely necessary for successful job
performance. 9' The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that
defendant's mandatory promotional requirements discriminated
against the plaintiffs under Title VII because performance on such
tests was not absolutely necessary for successful job performance, and
because job preference and promotions within the defendant's
company were preserved for Caucasians, as had been done in the
past.9
Approximately twenty years after the Griggs' decision, Congress
codified disparate impact in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.98 Although
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 explicitly stated that disparate impact
applied in Title VII cases, the Act was mute as to whether disparate
impact applied to the ADEA.99 Despite the Act's silence, the courts
continued to apply disparate treatment and disparate impact to age
discrimination claims without hesitation. However, the Supreme
Court sent a different message to the lower courts regarding whether
91. Id. at 427-28, 91 S. Ct at 851-52.
92. Id. at 429, 91 S. Ct. at 852.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 431, 91 S. Ct. at 853.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. However, the Supreme Court did not prohibit the use of tests that had a
discriminatory effect, as long as the tests were essential for the job position. Id. at
432, 91 S. Ct. at 854.




disparate impact should be applied to age discrimination claims in its
1993 decision, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins."°
III. HAZEN PAPER Co. V. BIGGINS: THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST
INDICATION THAT ALL PRINCIPLES DEVELOPED UNDER TITLE VII
MIGHT NOT APPLY UNDER THE ADEA
In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 1 the Supreme Court set the tone
for evaluating ADEA claims differently from other employment
discrimination claims under Title VII. In Hazen, the plaintiff, a sixty-
two year old employee, claimed that his employer had fired him
because of his age two weeks prior to his qualifying for a pension.'°2
To receive a pension, Hazen Paper Company required each employee
to work for the company for ten years." The Court held that,
although Hazen Paper Company had interfered with Biggin's ability
to receive his pension benefits, this fact alone did not serve as an
indication that the company had discriminated against Biggins
because of his age."0
The Court began its analysis by evaluating the purpose of the
ADEA.'0 5 Hazen recognized that Congress enacted the ADEA to
protect older workers in both the hiring and firing processes from
employers who hold misconceptions about older persons' abilities
and productivity." The Court noted that, unlike other forms of
discrimination, age discrimination is not founded on animus based
feelings toward older persons. 1°7 Rather, age discrimination occurs
because employers rely on stereotypical beliefs that older persons are
incapable of functioning within the workforce because of their age,
instead of evaluating each individual's skill and abilities."0 The
stereotypical nature of age discrimination makes it unique among
other forms of discrimination, such as race, which have historically
been motivated by hate."°
The Hazen Court emphasized the fact that employers must
evaluate employees solely upon their individual abilities and not upon
100. 507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 606, 113 S. Ct. at 1704.
103. Id. at 607, 113 S. Ct. at 1704.
104. Id. at 613, 113 S. Ct. at 1707-08.




109. Id.; Lane, supra note 24, at 344 n.14 (discussing the difference between
race discrimination and age discrimination, because the latter is not as emotionally
charged); see also supra note 25 (author's comment).
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their age. 1 ' But the Court acknowledged that as long as age is not the
motivating factor in an employer's decision, then the problem of
fostering ageist stereotypes disappears. 1 The Court noted that this
reasoning holds true even when age is related to the motivating factor
underlying the employment decision, such as the pension at issue in
Hazen.112 The Court recognized that more of the older employees at
Hazen Paper Company were closer to reaching their ten years of
service than the younger employees.' 13 But, the Court reasoned that
age was only correlated with the length of time required to receive a
pension.11 4 The Court stressed that the lower court's determination
that age discrimination had occurred solely based upon the
interference with Biggins' ability to receive his pension was an
unsubstantiated assumption. 5 The Court added that "a decision by
the company to fire an older employee solely because he has nine-
plus years of service and therefore is 'close to vesting' would not
constitute discriminatory treatment on the basis of age."
' 1 6
Furthermore, the Court indicated that unless an employer specifically
uses a stereotype about older employees (i.e., that they are less
productive), there has been no age discrimination in the workplace. 7
But, the Court stressed that an ADEA violation could be well-
founded if facts revealed that Biggins' employers knew or showed
reckless disregard for ensuring that their actions complied with the
ADEA.1 8 Therefore, the Court remanded the case and cautioned the
lower court about equating an employee's vesting period with his or
her age. 19
The Supreme Court's decision in Hazen "threw into disarray the
apparently settled rule that disparate impacts could violate the
ADEA."1 0 Although the Court concluded that disparate treatment
violates the ADEA, it refused to decide whether employment actions





115. Id. at 611-12, 113 S. Ct. at 1707.
116. Id. at612, 113 S. Ct. at 1707.
117. Id. at 610, 113 S. Ct. at 1706.
118. Id. at 616, 113 S. Ct. at 1709. Please note that although this language
appears to indicate that the Supreme Court in Hazen approved the application of
disparate impact to ADEA cases, the Court did not definitively answer this question.
119. Id. at 614, 113 S. Ct. at 1708. On remand, Biggins lost his ADEA claim,
but was able to prevail on his ERISA claim. Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 111 F.3d
205 (1st Cir. 1997).
120. Nathan E. Holmes, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967:
Are Disparate Impact Claims Available?, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 299, 309 (2000).
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resulting in disparate impact constitute age discrimination.1 2' Due to
the Court's lack of guidance, there is a circuit split among the lower
courts regarding the applicability of the disparate impact theory to
ADEA claims.
The Court's failure to address the applicability of the disparate
impact theory to ADEA claims may be due, in part, to how the
ADEA's protected class is defined. Age is not an immutable
characteristic; it is a characteristic that a person grows into later in life
as opposed to a characteristic, such as race or gender, that a person is
born with.1 23  Inevitably, it is this factor that will cause every
employee, if he or she lives long enough, to become an economic
liability to his or her employer.r24 In essence, age discrimination
differs from discrimination based upon race or sex, because age, the
defining class factor, is a continuum.121 As a continuum, age has
presented the courts with a unique set of problems. In Ellis v. United
Airlines Incorporated, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals summed
up its apprehensiveness to extend the disparate impact theory to
ADEA claims by stating, "[D]isparate impact age discrimination
claims would create several practical problems ... the line defining
the class that is disparately impacted by a challenged policy is an
imprecise one, which could be manipulated to either strengthen or
121. 507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701. See generally Roberta Sue Alexander, The
Future ofDisparate ImpactAnalysis forAge Discrimination in a Post-Hazen Paper
World, 25 U. Dayton L. Rev. 75 (1999) (arguing that the courts should still be able
to apply disparate impact to ADEA claims in order to further Congress' goal of
eliminating age discrimination).
122. Some courts-including the United States Courts of Appeals for the First,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits-have opted to prohibit disparate impact claims, while
others-including the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits-relying on scholarly literature, have allowed disparate impact
claims in ADEA cases. Other Circuits, such as the Eleventh Circuit, have yet to
address the issue of disparate impact in ADEA cases, but appear to be leaning
against allowing such claims. Holmes, supra note 120, at 311-17 (2000). In fact,
only recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
disparate impact theory of liability is inapplicable to ADEA claims. Smith v. City
of Jackson, Mississippi, 351 F.3d 183, 195 (5th Cir. 2003) ("We [the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals] ... follow the majority of circuit courts to have addressed this
issue in holding that a disparate impact theory of liability is not cognizable under
the ADEA."). However, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
review the Fifth Circuit's decision in Smith and will ultimately decide whether
disparate impact analysis is applicable to the ADEA. Id., cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
1724 (2004).
123. Tracey A. Cullen, Reverse Age Discrimination Suits and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 18 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 271, 303-04
(2003).
124. Lane, supra note 24, at 106.
125. Id. Unlike the ADEA, Title VII's protected classes are defined by concrete
and distinct characteristics which are readily identified.
COMMENTS 42520041
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
weaken the impact of a policy on some age group." 126 Overall, the
Hazen Court' s opinion suggests that, despite their similar beginnings
and purposes, Title VII and the ADEA are different: due to the
unique composition of the ADEA's protected class, discrimination
theories such as disparate impact are inapplicable to the ADEA, and
yet remain applicable to Title VII claims."'
The Supreme Court's decision in Hazen also expressed for the
first time that the ADEA and Title VII were motivated by different
concerns. 128 Like Secretary of Labor Wirtz discussed in his report to
Congress in 1964, the Hazen Court took notice of the fact that age
discrimination, unlike other forms of discrimination, was not founded
upon animus or hate-based feelings; rather, it arose generally from
misconceptions that employers held about older employees'
capabilities and productivity in the workplace. 2 9 Interestingly, the
historical, motivating factor for age discrimination-misconceptions
about one's capabilities in the workplace-parallels that of
discrimination based upon physical and mental disabilities.13 °
In hindsight, the Court's ruling in Hazen served as the
springboard from which other challenges would be made regarding
the dissimilarities between Title VII and ADEA claims.' One of the
recent and more controversial issues that may be attributed to Hazen
is reverse age discrimination claims. This issue was presented to the
Supreme Court in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline.
132
IV. GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC. V. CLINE
A. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline-Procedural
Development
In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,133 a class of
employees, aged forty through forty-nine, sued their employer on an
age discrimination claim.' 4  Through a collective bargaining
126. 73 F.3d. 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996).
127. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706
(1993).
128. Id. at 610-11, 113 S. Ct. at 1706.
129. Id.; Wirtz, supra note 1, at 2, 5-6; see also infra note 254 (author's
comments).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2004); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(1) (1990).
131. In fact, three years after Hazen, the Supreme Court would have to consider
whether the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme, as applied in Title VII claims,
suited ADEA claims in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.
308, 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).





agreement, the plaintiffs' employer had adjusted its employees'
retirement health benefits, such that employees who had reached their
fiftieth birthday by July 1, 1997, were able to receive their full
employee health benefits after retirement; however, the employer
eliminated health benefits for the remaining employees who had not
attained fifty years of age or thirty years of employment with the
company. 135 The plaintiffs, relying on the fact that they were within the
protected class because of their ages (forty to forty-nine), claimed that
they had been victims of age discrimination."' However, in its
opinion, the district court classified and analyzed the plaintiffs' age
discrimination claim as a "reverse" age discrimination claim. 37
Essentially, the issue before the district court was whether a reverse age
discrimination claim was viable under the ADEA. In its analysis, the
district court noted that no federal court had ever deemed reverse age
discrimination claims to be viable.138 Therefore, the district court
dismissed the plaintiffs' suit because the action did not meet the
ADEA's purpose, nor did the ADEA support reverse age
discrimination claims. 39
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed."'4 The majority held that the employer's more favorable
treatment of employees aged fifty years or older enabled the plaintiffs
to bring an age discrimination suit under the ADEA. 4' The majority
relied on a strict interpretation of the ADEA, specifically focusing on
the word "individual."' The majority reasoned that the ADEA and the
Congressional purpose behind the ADEA offered protection to any
individual age forty years and older from discriminatory treatment on
the basis of his or her age. The majority also discounted the use of the
term "reverse discrimination," insisting that an action is either
discriminatory or it is not. 13 Ultimately, the court held that, because
the plaintiffs were within the ADEA's protected class when they were
denied an employment benefit solely on the basis of their age, they had
a valid age discrimination claim.' The majority reversed the lower
court's ruling which had dismissed plaintiffs' suit.1 45
135. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 296 F.3d 466, 466-68 (6th Cir. 2002).
136. Gen. Dynamics v. Cline, 540 U.S. at 124 S. Ct. at 1237.
137. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 98 F. Supp. 2d 848 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 296 F.3d 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2002).
141. Id. at 469-70.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 471 ("Moreover, we do not share the commonly held belief that this
situation is one of so-called 'reverse discrimination.' ... [Tihe expression 'reverse
discrimination' has no ascertainable meaning in the law.").




The dissent criticized the majority for allowing the plaintiffs to
bring their claim, whether it be called a "reverse age discrimination"
claim or not.'46 The dissent relied heavily on other circuits' opinions
regarding "reverse age discrimination," particularly Hamilton v.
Caterpillar, Inc. 147 In Hamilton, the Seventh Circuit stressed the
uniqueness of age discrimination distinguishing age from other forms
of discrimination. Specifically, the court observed that age, unlike
race or gender, does not arise at birth and is not an immutable
characteristic.1 4' Relying on the Hamilton court, the dissent reasoned
that Congress did not enact the ADEA to protect the young against
the older; nor did the court believe that the ADEA offered any
protection to the "younger old" against the "older old., 149 Overall, the
General Dynamics dissent concluded that the Congressional purpose
of the ADEA was to protect the older person in the workforce, not the
younger. 150
The United States Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari to
review the Sixth Circuit's decision in General Dynamics. 
5
'
Ultimately, the Court held that reverse age discrimination claims are
not permissible under the ADEA, thereby reversing the Sixth
Circuit's decision.152
B. Taking a Closer Look at the United States Supreme Court's
Opinion in General Dynamics
1. The Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court's majority opinion, much like
the Sixth Circuit's dissent, relied heavily on the Congressional history
and development of the ADEA in reaching its decision. Initially the
Supreme Court's majority opinion addressed the significance of
146. Id. at 476 (Williams, J. dissenting).
147. Id. (citing Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992)).
148. Hamilton, 966 F. 2d, at 1227.
149. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics, 296 F.3d at 476.
150. Id.
151. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 538 U.S. 976, 123 S. Ct. 1786(2003).
152. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 124 S. Ct. 1236
(2004). However, it is important to note that reverse age discrimination claims may
not be impossible following the General Dynamics decision on the state level. If
states enact legislation that broadly defines "age," or lowers the age limit of the
protected class, then reverse age discrimination claims may remain a viable legal
alternative at the state level. See Rebecca L. Ennis, General Dynamics Land
Systems, Inc. v. Cline: Shrinking the Realm of Possibility for Reverse Age
Discrimination Suits, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 753,768 (discussing a Michigan law that
defines age as "chronological age" and Oregon's age discrimination laws that offer
coverage to persons eighteen years old and older).
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Congress' decision not to incorporate the ADEA into Title VII. 53
Instead, Congress had instructed the Secretary of Labor to assess the
prevalence of age discrimination within the workplace. 54  The
Secretary compiled his findings into a report which revealed not only
that "age was a serious problem, but one different in kind from
discrimination on account of race."15 5 The majority also reviewed
Congressional testimony regarding age discrimination which focused
on the "unjustified assumptions about the effect of age on ability to
work."156
Overall, the majority stressed the fact that in all of the
Congressional material it had reviewed, it found nothing that
suggested that "any workers were registering complaints about
discrimination in favor of their seniors. ""' Relying upon the
ADEA's legislative history the majority concluded that "beyond
reasonable doubt, [that] the ADEA was concerned to protect a
relatively old worker from discrimination that works to the advantage
of the relatively young."158 Furthermore, the majority noted that
although it had not decided any previous cases addressing the same
issue of reverse age discrimination, all of the ADEA cases it had
handled in the past showed the Court's "consistent understanding that
the text, structure, and history point to the ADEA as a remedy for
unfair preference based on relative youth, leaving complaints of the
relatively young outside the statutory concern."1 59 Through the
Court's reasoning, it ultimately concluded that reverse age
discrimination claims are implausible under the ADEA framework.
2. The Supreme Court's Dissenting Opinions
a. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia offered one of the two dissenting opinions in
General Dynamics. In his dissent, Justice Scalia deferred to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulation which
interpreted title 29, section 628 of the ADEA. Specifically, the
EEOC's regulation stated as follows:
153. Gen Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 587, 124 S. Ct. at 1240.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 588, 124 S. Ct. at 1241.
157. Id. at 589, 124 S. Ct. at 1242. Interestingly, the Court further noted that
respondent Cline had failed to provide the Court with any Congressional reports or
findings to suggest that workers were filing complaints because their employers
were treating older employees more favorably.
158. Id. at 590-91, 124 S. Ct. at 1243.
159. Id. at 582, 593-94, 124 S. Ct. at 1238, 1244.
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It is unlawful in situations where this Act applies, for an
employer to discriminate in hiring or in any other way by
giving preference because of age between individuals 40 and
over. Thus, if two people apply for the same position, and
one is 42 and the other 52, the employer may not lawfully turn
down either one on the basis of age, but must make such
decision on the basis of some other factor. 60
Justice Scalia criticized the Court for discounting the EEOC's
interpretation of the ADEA, thereby asserting that the EEOC's
interpretation was "entirely reasonable."'61 Justice Scalia summed up
his dissent by simply stating that he would defer to the agency's
(EEOC) "authoritative conclusion."1 62
b. Justice Thomas' Dissent
Justice Thomas authored the other dissenting opinion in General
Dynamics. 163 Justice Thomas criticized the majority for analyzing the
ADEA through a "social history" analysis, instead of relying upon the
strict, textual reading of the statute.'" Relying upon the strict
interpretation of the ADEA, Justice Thomas believed that the
plaintiffs had a valid claim under the ADEA: "[t]he plain language
of the ADEA clearly allows for suits brought by the relatively young
when discriminated against in favor of the relatively old." 16
Justice Thomas also argued that the majority was misguided in
its suggestion that the ADEA was enacted only to protect the older
employee over the younger-old employee.1 66  In making his
argument, Thomas compared the ADEA to Title VII. 167 The Justice
stated that clearly the momentum behind the enactment of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act was to offer protections strictly to racial
minorities, with a specific emphasis on black persons.
68
Furthermore he noted that there was "no record evidence 'that
[white] workers were suffering at the expense of [racial minorities]'
and in 1964, discrimination against whites in favor of racial
minorities was hardly 'a social problem requir[ing] a federal statute
160. Id. at 601, 124 S. Ct. at 1249 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2003)).
161. Id. at 602, 124 S. Ct. at 1249.
162. Id.
163. Id. Justice Kennedy joined Justice Thomas in his dissenting opinion.
164. Id. at 602-03, 124 S. Ct. at 1249-50.
165. Id. at 603, 124 S. Ct. at 1250.
166. Id. at 607-08, 124 S. Ct. at 1252-53.




to place a [white] worker in parity with [racial minorities]."" 69
Hence, Justice Thomas suggested that under the majority's analysis
of the ADEA, the Court "has been treading down the wrong path
with respect to Title VII since at least 1976. " 170 It was in 1976
when the Supreme Court held in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co. that Title VII offers protections to all persons,
and is not limited in application to members of one particular race
over another. 171
Overall, Justice Thomas contended that, unlike the majority
opinion, age discrimination under the ADEA should be treated in
the same fashion as race under Title VII: "namely, . . . that age
discrimination cuts both ways and a relatively younger individual
could sue when discriminated against.
172
c. The Majority Opinion's Use of the Protected Class or
Antisubordination Theory of Discrimination
1. Antisubordination Theory of Discrimination
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in General Dynamics
utilized the protected class or antisubordination theory of
discrimination in assessing whether a reverse age discrimination
claim was viable under the ADEA.173 The protected class theory of
discrimination relies on a "holistic" approach to statutory
interpretation. 174 A protected class theorist takes into account the
historical and real life conditions that have led to the creation of
antidiscrimination statutes.1 75  The protected class theory of
discrimination condemns certain practices not because they are
unfair, but because they promote subordination of the group in
which the individual who is excluded or ostracized is a member.1
76
For example, a protected class theorist would consider the need to
overcome male dominance within society when determining
whether or not a sex discrimination claim is viable under Title VII.
169. Id. at 611, 124 S. Ct. at 1254.
170. Id.
171. 427 U.S. 273, 280, 96 S. Ct. 2574, 2579 (1976).
172. Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 612, 124 S. Ct. at 1255 (2004).
173. Id., 124 S. Ct. 1236 (majority opinion); Owen Fiss, Another Equality,
Issues in Legal Scholarship (2004), available at
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art20 (last visited Jan. 19, 2005) (commenting that
the antisubordination theory has also been referred to as the "group-disadvantaging
principle ... anticaste, antisubjugation... principle").
174. David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem
in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697, 1778 (2002).
175. Id. at 1776.
176. Fiss, supra note 173, at 3-4.
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As Professor David Schwartz notes, the protected class or
antisubordination theory helps to provide answers for many of the
questions created by antidiscrimination law, because antisubordination
theorists have helped to "wage the moral battle for proper
understanding of antidiscrimination law." '177 For instance, this theory
helps to explain why equating race with low educational achievement
or dangerousness, as in racial profiling, no matter how statistically
accurate, is prohibited.7 ' It has also been used to explain that the real
purpose of affirmative action is not to create a more diverse academic
environment, although this may be an indirect effect.'79 Rather, to an
antisubordination theorist, the main purpose of affirmative action is to
end the subordination of historically disadvantaged groups by giving
them access to, and control of, larger shares of power that, otherwise,
they might not receive.8 0 Critical race theorists have coined this effect
of affirmative action "racial dehierarchalization."'' However, formal
equality theorists are quick to criticize that such practices, like
affirmative action, only enable "anti-discrimination law to
discriminate."' 82
The protected class or antisubordination theory of discrimination
has also been applied in the employment setting. For example,
employers have been encouraged to create new testing devices to
evaluate potential applicants. 181 These "newer" tests guarantee that
minorities are not excluded from employment opportunities.'84
However, one of the major criticisms in this area is that such practices
compromise productive efficiency in a way in which formal equality
theory does not.'85
Other criticism of the protected class or antisubordination theory is
directed at Constitutional protections. Some critics argue against these
theories because protection of groups is inconsistent with the
Constitutional protections of "individuals" or "persons."'86 However,
such attacks have been rebuffed by protected class theorists as being
"without basis."1 87  Even the most adamant individualist theorist
177. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1779.
178. Fiss, supra note 173, at 4.
179. Id. at 6-7 (Fiss notes that others denote this as "the eradication of the
caste.").
180. Id. at 7.
181. Id.
182. William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the
Workplace, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 91, 141 (2003).
183. Fiss, supra note 173, at 8.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 19.
187. Id.
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understands that individuals are not solely judged by their own
accomplishments and contributions to society; rather, individuals are
inevitably judged by their class membership. 8 The protected class
theory is best fit to address this problem because it acknowledges that
subordination exists within society, and it evaluates the historical,
social boundaries that have hindered, and continue to hinder, minority
group advancement.8 9
2. Antisubordination Theory Exemplified by the Majority
Opinion
The protected class theory of discrimination undergirds the Court's
majority opinion as exemplified by their concerns about attaining, and
then maintaining equal treatment for persons within a subordinate
class-the older class of workers, age forty years and older. Hence,
relying on the components which comprise the protected class theory
of discrimination, the Supreme Court concluded through reflection of
the "social history," Congressional intent, and legislative history that
the ADEA precluded all reverse age discrimination claims, thereby
resulting in the reversal of the Sixth Circuit's decision in General
Dynamics."°
The majority used the Secretary of Labor's report from 1967 and
the Congressional hearings regarding the implementation of the ADEA
to assess historical and societal impetus for enacting the ADEA.
Evaluations of these sources led the Court to the conclusion that
arbitrary age discrimination was prevalent and required legislative
action in order to be remedied. 9 The majority stressed the fact that the
Secretary's report revealed the prevalent subordination of older workers
in the* workforce, such that "the report contains no suggestion that
reactions to age level off at some point, and it was devoid of any
indication that the Secretary had noticed unfair advantages accruing to
older employees at the expense of their juniors. ' 9
188. Id.
189. However, it should be noted that some proponents of the protected class or
antisubordination theory argue that, currently, such theories are still not developed
enough to address the complexity of subordination. These theorists advocate for
a more multidimensional antisubordination theory because the intersectionality of
several factors, such as race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation, contribute to
the subordination of groups of persons. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity
Crisis: "Intersectionality, " "Multidimensionality," and the Development of an
Adequate Theory of Subordination," 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 285 (2001).
190. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600, 124 S. Ct.
1236, 1248 (2004).




The Court also evaluated the Congressional testimony that was
given in preparing the legislative proposal to address the problem
of age discrimination. The testimony "dwelled on unjustified
assumptions about the effect of age on ability to work."'1 93
Specifically, the testimony focused on older workers who were not
hired, despite their qualifications, because of an employer's
arbitrary assessment of the individual as being too old.' 94 The
Congressional record contained ample documents which reflected
the common societal consensus, that over time, as one ages, getting
hired becomes more difficult, and when there is a choice to be made
between a younger and an older individual for a job position, the
younger individual will have the upper hand because she will not be
"tagged with demeaning stereotype [s]." 95 The majority also
emphasized that the Congressional hearings suggested that older
persons received unfair treatment due to their higher benefit and
pension costs to employers. 19
6
Furthermore, the majority touched upon the fact that had
Congress been concerned about protecting younger persons against
the older, it would not have set an age minimum of forty, thereby
ignoring all persons younger than forty.197 And although the Court
did recognize that all persons might be discriminated against
because of their age, it concluded that age discrimination at forty
years old and older is much different than discrimination against a
teenager where "[t]he youthful deficiencies of inexperience and
unsteadiness invite stereotypical and discriminatory thinking about
those a lot younger than 40."9' Sadly, the Court acknowledged that
the prejudice a forty year old experiences is not based upon her
youth: "The enemy of 40 is 30, not 50."' 99
Overall, by relying on the protected class theory of
discrimination through the use of legislative history and
Congressional findings, the General Dynamics Court concluded,
"beyond reasonable doubt," that the ADEA was enacted to protect
the relatively older worker from discrimination that gives the
relatively younger worker an unfair advantage within the
workplace."00
193. Id. at 588, 124 S. Ct. at 1241.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 589, 124 S. Ct. at 1242.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 591, 124 S. Ct. at 1243.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 590-91, 124 S. Ct. at 1243.
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d. Justice Thomas' Dissenting Opinion and His Use of the
Formal Equality Theory of Discrimination
1. Formal Equality Theory of Discrimination
Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion in General Dynamics
appealed to the formal equality theory of discrimination. 2°' Formal
equality theory, or the status neutral theory, dictates that
antidiscrimination law covered by Title VII is "colorblind.,
20 2
Formal equality theory advocates that the purpose of
antidiscrimination law is to eliminate the consideration of all
discriminatory factors, such as race or gender, in making
employment decisions. 0 3 Essentially, the formal equality theory
prohibits the preferential treatment of any group of persons, such as
women or minorities, regardless of how employers have treated
them in the past.2° Overall, it cannot be denied that formal equality
theory has diminished inequality among some oppressed groups
within our culture; however, it has not completely eradicated the
problem.2 5
Basically, when deciding whether a person should be hired
under the formal equality theory, an employer will not take any
protected characteristics into account.20 6 For instance, under Title
VII, an employer may not discriminate against another based upon
his or her race. 2 7 Therefore, an employer must not take race into
account when making a hiring decision. 0 8 For the employer to hire
an African-American over a white employee, when both are equally
qualified, simply because the company lacks diversity, would
constitute racism under Title VII for a formal equality theorist. In
the eyes of a formal equality theorist, discrimination against white
males is just as wrong as discrimination against historically
disadvantaged minorities.2°9
201. Id. at 602, 124 S. Ct. at 1249.
202. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1775; Corbett, supra note 182, at 141; Nan
D. Hunter, Panel VI: Fighting Gender and Sexual Orientation Harassment-The
Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & Pol'y 397,401 (2001)
(describing formal equality theory as the "old, boring version of civil rights law");
Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279, 1292
(1987) (assimilation and androgyny are recognized as two models of formal
equality theory).
203. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1776.
204. Corbett, supra note 182, at 141.
205. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Factless Jurisprudence, 34 Colum. Hum. Rts.
L. Rev. 615, 624 (2003).
206. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1776-77.
207. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2004).
208. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1775-76.
209. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 658.
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Formal equality theory is problematic because it advocates the
concept of fairness by relying upon the belief that similar cases
should be treated alike."' l Although this may sound acceptable and
even equitable, in application the formal equality theory limits
social progress by preserving the white, male dominated caste
system. " For instance, early feminists, such as Ruth Bader
Ginsberg, initially formulated their arguments for equal treatment
of the sexes based on the formal equality theory; yet, over time,
feminist theorists have abandoned and heavily criticized this theory
as being inadequate and unjust. 12 A formal equality theorist
minimizes differences between the sexes and sees no need for
differential treatment under the law and public policy.213 And yet,
although formal equality theory enables women to compete with
men for the same employment positions, it fails miserably in
helping women combine a professional life with being the primary
caretakers of their children.1 4
The formal equality theory's viewpoint is one lacking any real-
world societal influence and any historical perspective regarding
what types of discrimination led to the enactment of corrective
legislation; therefore, no color is added to the situation in order to
determine whether or not a discriminatory activity has occurred.215
Simply put, a formal equality theorist's viewpoint is best described
as being black and white. In General Dynamics Justice Thomas'
210. See Hutchinson, supra note 205, at 625-26 (criticizing courts for taking
ahistorical approaches to discrimination claims, particularly race discrimination
claims).
211. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1777; see generally Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45
Stan. L. Rev. 1133 (1993) (criticizing formal equality theory because it is unable
to remedy most forms of racism and reinforces a social hierarchy).
212. Hunter, supra note 202, at 403; Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal
Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 209, 257, 259-72 (1998).
213. Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory
Behind Title IX, 34 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 13, 25 (2001).
214. Becker, supra note 212, at 256-59 (addressing feminist arguments about the
formal equality theory's inability to adapt new rules to accommodate women's
changing lifestyles as well as their male counterparts); see generally Peggie R.
Smith, Parental-status Employment Discrimination: A Wrong in Need of a Right?
35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 569 (2002) (arguing against applying formal equality
theory to parental-status discrimination because it does not take social and
biological factors into account, nor does it accommodate working parents); see also
Dana Page, D. C. F.D.: An Equal Opportunity Employer-As Long As You Are Not
Pregnant, 24 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 9, 14 (2002) (discussing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and how formal equality has "made it difficult for women to
gain workplace accommodations for their culturally based caregiving
responsibilities").
215. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1776.
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dissenting opinion exemplifies the formal equality theory of
discrimination within the context of the ADEA. 6
2. Formal Equality Theory Exemplified by Justice Thomas'
Dissent
Justice Thomas began his dissent by stating that, "[T]his should
have been an easy case."21 7 Had the majority accepted Justice
Thomas' interpretation of the ADEA under the formal equality
theory, then General Dynamics could have been quickly and "easily"
resolved in Thomas' favor. Justice Thomas' adherence to a strict,
textual interpretation of the ADEA, led him to conclude that the
plaintiffs in General Dynamics did have a claim solely because they
were discriminated against because of their age.2"' For Justice
Thomas, the plain meaning of the statute controls whether an
individual may bring forth a discrimination claim, not the social
history as was advocated by the majority;2"9 Thomas' strict adherence
to the statutory text exemplifies the essence of the formal equality
theory. With that, Justice Thomas reviewed and deemed the ADEA
to be clear upon its face.
Justice Thomas criticized the majority for adhering to the "social
history" of the ADEA, a "new tool of statutory interpretation" within
their opinion.22 Thomas also criticized the majority for interpreting
the Congressional purpose for enacting the ADEA as encompassing
only the most prevalent form of discrimination, which in General
Dynamics would have been strictly limited to the discrimination of
older persons in favor of younger persons, thereby eliminating the
discrimination of younger persons in favor of older persons.
Instead, Justice Thomas argued, consistent with the formal equality
theory of discrimination, that all persons deserved to be equally
protected under the ADEA and no one, regardless of their old age or
their youth, should be left without such protection.222
Justice Thomas' analysis of relying on a strict textual application
of the ADEA, whereby he dismissed the importance of assessing the
social history encompassing the ADEA' s enactment, is not an unusual
or uncommon approach taken by those who serve as justices on the
216. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 602, 124 S. Ct.
1236, 1249 (2004).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 602-03, 124 S. Ct. at 1249-50.
219. Id. at 602, 124 S. Ct. at 1249-50.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 608, 124 S. Ct. at 1253.
222. ld. at 613, 124 S. Ct. at 1256.
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bench." 3 In fact, Professor David Schwartz has suggested that the
formal equality theory of discrimination "appeals to the judicial
mind" for this very reason.224 Judicial affinity for the formal equality
theory of discrimination is derived from the fact that it is simpler to
comprehend than the antisubordination theory as most judges are not
"accomplished feminist thinkers," or educated and experienced in the
like.2 5 But more importantly, the formal equality theory of
discrimination is favored by judges because it enables them to make
quick, and more importantly, neutral decisions regarding the
applicability of a statute to a particular scenario, 226 by narrowly
focusing on the statutory text, thereby avoiding any need for fact
intensive inquiries into motivation in discrimination cases.227 Thus,
when confronted by a statute such as the ADEA, under the formal
equality theory the issue before the court will simply be whether or
not members of the protected class have been discriminated against
based upon their age. Clearly Justice Thomas implored the formal
equality theory of discrimination in his dissent, thus enabling him to
conclude that the plaintiffs in General Dynamics had a valid claim
of reverse age discrimination under of the ADEA.
e. Final Thoughts on the Protected Class and
Antisubordination Theory of Discrimination
Despite the theoretical debate among proponents of the formal
equality theory of discrimination and the protected class theory of
discrimination, one common factor holds true: while both of these
theories may be able to operate within the Title VII framework, the
same is not true for the ADEA. More precisely, it might be argued
that the formal equality theory may not adequately function within the
ADEA framework.
One can support the argument that formal equality theory
functions in Title VII claims. This may be attributable to the very
nature of Title VII's protected class categories, which are distinct and
relatively clear-cut. For instance, each class of persons protected
under Title VII is readily identified with a specific gender and racial
class. When an employer hires or promotes an individual solely
based upon the applicant's gender, for example, regardless of whether
it prefers males or females, the employer is discriminating on the
223. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1778.
224. Id.; see, e.g., Brake, supra note 213, at 24; Corbett, supra note 182, at 141-
42 (discussing the fact that formal equality is the dominant theory in discrimination
case law).
225. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1777.
226. Id. at 1778.
227. Id. at 1777.
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basis of sex. Under the formal equality theory, regardless of which
gender is being preferred, discrimination based on an employee's sex
is occurring; therefore, the employer has clearly violated Title VII.228
However, the application of formal equality theory in situations
where the protected class lacks a group identity is more problematic.
Such a situation arises in claims brought under the ADEA and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).229
Age and disability, unlike gender and race, are not black or white
variables. Age, like disability, encompasses a whole spectrum of
issues. Although all persons age on a yearly basis, only those
individuals forty years and older are statutorily protected from age
discrimination.2 3 However, this factor alone does not clearly indicate
any commonalities that members of its protected class possess.
Individuals protected by the ADEA, like those protected under the
ADA, do not necessarily share any other attributes with persons who
are within their respective protected classes.
In essence, unlike Title VII, individuals protected under the
ADEA and the ADA have difficulty forming a group identity. For
example, although a forty year old and a seventy year old employee
are both protected by the ADEA, aside from meeting the statutory age
requirement triggering the ADEA's protections, it is difficult to
comprehend what other similarities they might share that would
logically lead them to be grouped together in the same protected
class. The ADA operates in a similar way. The ADA offers
protection to all individuals who are discriminated against based upon
their physical or mental disabilities.231 Under the ADA, the
disabilities of one individual within the protected class may be as
discreet as dyslexia, but for another person the disability may be as
conspicuous as confinement to a wheelchair for mobility. Aside from
the fact that these two individuals each have a disability, they may
share no other common characteristic.
This lack of a group identity makes the application of formal
equality theory to the ADEA and ADA almost nonsensical. Whereas
the formal equality theory can be argued as providing just results by
eliminating discrimination based upon race or gender in Title VII
claims, what justice will be served by permitting a reverse
discrimination claim under the ADA for a person without a
disability? 23 2 While advocates of the formal equality theory may
suggest that racial discrimination against white males is no less evil
228. Id. at 1777-78.
229. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2004).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2004).
231. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2004).




than discrimination against women or minorities, the same cannot be
said for age and disability.233 As previously addressed, the very
nature of the class makes it difficult to argue that the formal equality
theory of discrimination can apply to both the ADEA and the ADA.
Congress wanted to protect a certain class of persons by enacting the
ADEA and the ADA and the terms used to classify these groups are
noninclusive. In other words, "age" does not mean that younger
persons are protected by the ADEA, and "disabled" does not mean
that those without a disability are covered by the ADA. Therefore, it
is necessary for courts and legal professionals to utilize the protected
class theory of discrimination when confronted with reverse age and
disability claims.
The protected class theory, which the majority of the Supreme
Court ultimately relied upon, allows courts to take into account the
historical and contemporary societal purpose for which an Act, such as
the ADEA or the ADA, was adopted 34 The social setting and purpose
of the ADEA provides the necessary weight to support age
discrimination claims being evaluated by a protected class theory of
discrimination. Congress enacted the ADEA to alleviate the
discriminatory hardships that persons forty years old and older were
encountering within the workplace. 235 A reverse age discrimination
claim, when considered in light of the ADEA's purpose, is simply not
feasible.2 36 The younger employee in society was not the person whom
Congress had concerns about finding and retaining employment.
A similar argument may be made for applying the protected class
theory of discrimination to ADA claims. The ADA was enacted to
provide persons with disabilities the same opportunities in employment
as those without disabilities.237 It is difficult to conceptualize that an
individual without a disability could ultimately file a reverse-ADA suit
because it does not further the ADA's purpose. How is an individual
without a disability capable of relying on the ADA to buttress his
argument that an employer discriminated against her because she did
233. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 658.
234. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 1776.
235. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2004); Wirtz, supra note 1.
236. See Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228. (7th Cir. 1992).
The Seventh Circuit comparing ADEA to ADA in light of reverse discrimination
claims stated:
There is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress had any
concern for the plight of workers arbitrarily denied opportunities and
benefits because they are too young. Age discrimination is thus somewhat
like handicap discrimination: Congress was concerned that older people
were being cast aside on the basis of inaccurate stereotypes about their
abilities. The young, like the nonhandicapped, cannot argue that they are
similarly victimized.
237. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22 (1990).
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not have a disability? An individual without a disability who attempts
to rely upon the ADA as a cause of action for discriminatory treatment
will inevitably defeat the purpose for which the statute was enacted.
Congress had no intention of offering aid to persons without disabilities
by enacting the ADA.238 Rather, Congress hoped to level the playing
field for those with disabilities to help them gain access to areas in
which they have historically been ostracized from or incapable of
entering, such as the employment setting, buildings, and society in
general.2 9 The absurdity demonstrated by a reverse ADA suit clarifies
the need to apply the protected class theory of discrimination to those
cases in which the protected class consists of a broad class of
persons.24°
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has been forced to
take a good, long, hard look at age discrimination within the work
environment. Within employment discrimination jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has recognized the differences between age which is
covered by the ADEA, and other characteristics, such as race and
gender, which are encompassed by Title VII. The Supreme Court has
continuously noted that despite their similar roots, discriminatory
principles and theories applicable to Title VII are not transplantable to
ADEA cases. With age discrimination, the Supreme Court has been
faced with particularly unique challenges. For instance, the Supreme
Court encountered its first hurdle in Hazen in which it had to determine
what age discrimination is, as opposed to what it is not. And more
recently in General Dynamics, the Supreme Court had to determine
whether reverse discrimination claims applicable to Title VII, are also
applicable to the ADEA. Ultimately, the Court, relying on a protected
class or antisubordination theoretical analysis, held that reverse age
discrimination claims cannot be substantiated under the ADEA.
238. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2004).
239. Miranda Oshige Mcgowan, Reconsidering the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 27, 40 (2000).
240. The following reverse-ADA case ranked number one on Gerald D.
Skoning' s, 2000 Ten Wackiest Employment Lawsuits, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 2001, at A2 1.
In Woods v. Phoenix Society of Cuyahoga County, 10 A.D. Cases 1086 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2000), the plaintiff, an employee at a non-profit organization, filed suit against
his employer for reverse discrimination under the ADA. The plaintiff alleged that
he was terminated from his position because he, unlike all of his co-workers, had
no prior mental health problem. Plaintiff alleged that when the director of Phoenix
became aware of his lack of mental handicap or disability, he began treating
plaintiff in a hostile manner. The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that plaintiff's reverse discrimination claim had merit because he was discriminated
against because he was a member of the majority, unlike his co-workers who were
members of the minority class (persons with disabilities). Id.
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It has been suggested that the protected class theory of
discrimination is the "conscience of Title VII claims;" however, as has
been discussed, the reasoning utilized by most courts is that of fonnal
equality. 4' Formal equality theory allows courts to rely on the strict
textual interpretations of discrimination arising under Title V1. 242
Since courts have traditionally, indiscriminately applied the same
reasoning used in Title VII cases to those arising under the ADEA, the
Supreme Court's reversal of the Sixth Circuit's decision in General
Dynamics is monumental. The Supreme Court's decision in General
Dynamics dispels any suggestion that pending and future ADEA claims
will be resolved under anything but the protected class theory.24 3
Because of the expected increase in the number of age
discrimination claims to be filed in the near future, courts will need to
embrace the protected class theory as the appropriate theory to utilize
in settling ADEA claims. The use of the protected class theory of
discrimination will ensure that the purpose and objective of the ADEA
is being maintained and utilized in the appropriate manner. Had the
Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit and its endorsement of the
formal equality theory, the ADEA would have inevitably lost all of its
credibility as a reliable means of protecting older employees from age
discrimination within the workplace. Overall, the Supreme Court's
decision to reverse the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
General Dynamics, by relying upon the protected class theory of
analysis, will inevitably preserve the purpose of the ADEA and protect
those for whom the ADEA was originally enacted.
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